We develop a theoretical model to analyse the effect of competition on the conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay compensation model of the credit rating industry. We find that relative to monopoly, rating agencies are more likely to inflate ratings under competition, resulting in lower expected welfare. These results do not depend on the presence of ratings shopping as in Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), but instead focus on the trade-off between maintaining reputation (to increase profits in the future) and inflating ratings today (to increase current profits).
Introduction
The credit rating industry aims to offer investors valuable information about issuers in need of financing. Due to the asymmetric information between the issuers and the investors, credit ratings often have pivotal impacts on the issuers' financing outcomes.
Before the 1970s, the rating agencies relied on an investor-pay model wherein investors subscribed to ratings released by the agencies and these subscription revenues were the main source of income for the rating agencies. However owing to the 'public good' nature of ratings 1 and the increase in free riding, rating agencies switched to the current issuerpay model and started charging issuers for ratings. As things stand today, the largest source of income for the rating agencies 2 are the fees paid by the issuers the rating agencies are supposed to impartially rate. 3 This tempts rating agencies to rate better than what fundamentals suggest.
Such behaviour has been criticised heavily since the onset of the recent financial crisis, in particularly over the AAA ratings that have been issued to complex structured products. Rating agencies played a crucial role in the rapid growth of structured finance.
According to Fitch Ratings (2007) , around 60% of all global structured products were AAA-rated, compared to less than 1% for corporate and financial issues. Following a subsequent jump in default rates, rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on structured products widely, indicating that the initial ratings were likely inaccurate.
A number of empirical papers find that the conflicts of interest problem play an important role in rating agencies' decisions. Griffin and Tang (2011) give striking empirical evidence of ratings inflation by rating agencies. They compare the CDO assumptions made by the ratings department and by the surveillance department within the same rating agency, and find the former uses more favorable assumptions. Moreover, it appears that the signals from the surveillance department were ignored and the CDOs favored by the ratings department were subsequently downgraded. Xia and Strobl (2012) provide further evidence of ratings inflation as a result of the issuer-pay model. They compare the ratings issued by Standard & Poor's Ratings Services (S&P) which follows the issuerpay model to those issued by the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR) which adopts the investor-pay model. They find that S&P inflates more relatively to EJR when S&P's conflict of interest is more acute.
It is often suggested that introducing more competition between rating agencies may help alleviate the conflicts of interest problem. However, a growing body of academic literature suggests that this may not be the case. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) show that, in the presence of asset complexity and ratings shopping, competition leads to lower welfare in equilibrium. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) also find that competition leads to more ratings inflation as issuers are able to more easily shop for ratings and that this effect is particular acute in boom times, when investors are more trusting. The contribution of our paper is to show that even in the absence of ratings shopping and asset complexity, and with rational investors, competition delivers lower welfare than monopoly. Our results stem from the fact that enhanced competition in the form of a new entrant reduces the incumbent's market share for ratings. This market sharing effect reduces the rent that rating agencies can derive from maintaining their reputation, encouraging ratings inflation even in the absence of ratings shopping. Our results suggest that current regulatory attempts to reduce ratings shopping 4 may not eliminate ratings inflation due to the underlying conflicts of interest problem.
We develop an infinite horizon model where rating agencies compete for market share and face a trade-off between reputation and current fees. Competition in our model has two effects -the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. Competition decreases ratings inflation through the disciplining effect as rating agencies have incentives to maintain or gain the market leadership. This channel is generally emphasized when it is argued that enhanced competition between rating agencies can resolve the conflict of interest. However, this ignores the other effect of competition -the reward from maintaining reputation is lower because competition implies that the market is shared between a larger number of rating agencies. We call this the market-sharing effect and study the impact of competition on the behaviour of rating agencies by exploring the interaction between these two opposite effects. Our results suggest that on balance the latter effect dominates and higher competition results in greater ratings inflation.
Given the structure of the market -with S&P's and Moody's having 80% of market share, 5 we model competition amongst the rating agencies in a duopolistic setting. In our model, issuers need a good rating to finance their projects. Rating agencies, which can be of two types -honest or strategic, perfectly observe the quality of the project and can either give the issuer a good rating or refuse rating. An honest rating agency always gives good ratings to good projects and no rating to bad projects while a strategic rating agency acts to maximise its expected profits. Neither investors nor issuers know for sure if a rating agency is honest and they Bayesian update on the reputation of the rating agencies, i.e. the probability that a rating agency is honest. The market share of the rating agency is modeled such that rating agencies with higher reputation attract more projects. Hence the rating agencies face a trade-off between current income and reputation which determines their future market share and income.
We compare the behaviour of rating agencies between the duopolistic case and the monopolistic case. 6 We first derive closed-form solutions in a three-period model and
show that the lax behaviour of a rating agency increases with the reputation of its competitor, i.e. competition leads to more lax behaviour and the market-sharing effect dominates. We then compute numerical solutions under an infinite-period setting, which enables us to relax parameter restrictions and extend the horizon of rating agencies, thereby making reputation more important for them.
Our results show that the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect when the degree of competition is sufficiently high, i.e. the reputation of the competitor is high. Moreover, we find that expected welfare is higher in the monopoly case than in the duopoly case as long as the reputation of the entrant rating agency (the competitor) is not greater than that of the incumbent rating agency. In our model, expected welfare rises only when the new entrant has a higher reputation vis-à-vis the incumbent, a situation which appears unlikely. We verify that the results are robust to different parameter specifications and on balance, our results suggest that increasing competition is likely to result in more ratings inflation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. In Section 3 we outline the basic features of our model. Section 4 describes the equilibrium in our model and Section 5 solves the model solution in a three-period setting. In Section 6 we solve the model numerically in an infinite horizon. We go on to compare the behaviour of rating agencies under monopoly and duopoly and discuss the expected welfare consequences of enhanced competition. Section 7 concludes. The proofs and additional robustness checks are presented in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) demonstrate that reputational concerns are not enough to solve the conflict of interest problem. In equilibrium, rating agencies are likely to behave laxly, i.e. rate bad projects as good and are prone to reputation cycles.
Our model innovates by introducing competition through an endogenous market share function and studying how competition affects the behaviour of rating agencies.
Becker and Milbourn (2011) lends support to our results by providing an empirical test of the impact of competition on rating agencies. They measure competition using the growth of Fitch's market share and find three pieces of evidence. First, the overall standards of ratings issued by S&P and Moody's increased (closer to the top AAA rating) with competition, so that ratings became more 'friendly'. Second, the correlation between bond yields and ratings fell as competition increased, implying that ratings became less informative. Third, equity prices started reacting more negatively to rating downgrades, suggesting a lower bar for rating categories. Their findings are consistent with our results that competition will tend to lower the quality of ratings in the market.
A recent paper by Xia (2012) provides some contrasting empirical evidence. The author compares S&P's rating quality before and after the entry of an investor paid rating agency and finds a significant improvement in the quality of S&P's ratings following the entry of the new rating agency. This result however is completely compatible with our model since an investor paid rating agency in our setting would be perfectly honest and our results suggest that in cases in which the incumbent RA has lower reputation than the entrant RA, welfare improvement is possible.
There has been an extensive literature that studies competition through reputation.
For example, Horner (2002) shows that the incentive to maintain good reputation and stay in the market can induce good firms to exert higher effort and try to distinguish themselves from the bad ones. The adverse effects of competition on the building and maintenance of reputation has been studied by Klein and Leffler (1981) . They argue that when faced with a choice between supplying high quality products or low quality ones, firms would be induced to supply high quality products only when the expected value of future income given a high reputation outweighs the short-run gain of lying. BarIsaac (2003) points out that the overall effect of competition on reputational incentives is ambiguous and may be non-monotonic, since increased competition can reduce the discounted value of maintaining a high reputation on the one hand, but can also lead to a more severe punishment for low reputation on the other. This intuition is very close to ours, except that we use a richer framework in the context of credit rating agencies.
Bouvard and Levy (2009) examine the trade-off between reputation and profits of rating agencies in a competitive setting and find that the threat of entry attenuates reputational effects. Mariano (2012) models how reputational concerns change rating agencies incentives to reveal private information. In a setting in which rating agencies have access to private and public information, her results provide a mechanism in which competition between rating agencies might inflate the ratings even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Compared to the above, the innovation of our paper is to endogenise the market share of rating agencies and to explore the welfare implications of competition. Damiano, Hao, and Suen (2008) study how the rating scheme may affect the strategic behaviour of rating agencies. They compare ratings inflation among centralised (all firms are rated together) and decentralised (firms are rated separately) rating schemes. When the quality of projects is weakly correlated, centralised rating dominates because decentralised rating leads to lower ratings inflation. The reverse holds when the correlation is strong. Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Chester (2009) White (2010) gives a historic overview of the market of the credit rating agencies and suggest that the regulatory framework contributed to the subprime mortgage debacle and associated financial crisis. They highlight how the major reliance of regulators on major rating agencies propelled them to the centre of US bond markets and led the mistakes by those rating agencies to have serious consequences for the financial sector.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) explore how the labour market for analysts and their incentives influence ratings accuracy. Motivated by the fact that rating analysts were fleeing the rating agencies for better paid investment bank jobs, they build a 2 period model in which analysts work for rating agencies in period 1 and can leave them to a better paid investment bank in period 2. They show that ratings accuracy increases with monitoring and also with investment bank profitability (as analysts train harder in period 1), but it is non-monotonic in the probability of the analyst getting a job in the investment bank.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2012) analyse how reputational concerns of rating agencies vary over the business cycle. A rating agency is more likely to issue less-accurate ratings in boom times, when income from fees is high, competition in the labour market for analysts is tough, and default probabilities for the securities rated are low. They also show that competition among the rating agencies delivers similar qualitative results.
However, competition is not the main focus of their paper and is modelled through an exogenous function between the degree of competition and the fees received by rating agencies.
Model Setup
We consider a discrete time setting with 3 types of agents -the issuers, the rating agencies (RA) and the investors. Each period, we have a new issuer 7 with a project that requires financing. We assume that issuers do not have funds of their own and need to obtain outside financing. The investors have funds and are willing to invest in the project provided they are convinced that it is profitable to do so. The role of the RA in this setting is to issue ratings that convince investors to provide financing.
More formally, each period we have one issuer that has a project which lasts for one period. All projects have a fixed pay-off Φ if successful and 0 otherwise and require an investment of X. This required investment X is uniformly distributed over (a,b) and its realisation is observed by all agents. The uniform distribution assumption ensures that we have a range of projects with different returns. Projects that require low investment have high return and vice versa. We can get similar results if we assume fixed investment with uncertain pay-off. The project is good with probability λ and bad with probability 1 − λ, and λ is independent of X. Good projects succeed with probability p G and fail with probability (1 − p G ). Bad projects always fail.
We assume that a-priori projects are not worth financing without rating, i.e. λp G Φ ≤ X. Further, the RAs can perfectly observe the type of project at no cost. After observing the type, the RA can either issue a good rating (GR) or no rating (NR). Note that we do not distinguish between bad rating and NR and abstract away from a ratings scale. In our setup, a good rating is one that allows the issuer to borrow from investors. It does not matter if this rating is AAA or A or BBB or even C. As long as the rating allows the firm to get financing, we consider it to be a GR. A bad rating in this setting will be a rating which does not enable a project to get financing. This is the same outcome as a NR and thus, a bad rating and NR are equivalent in our model.
The rating agency receives income I if it issues GR, and 0 otherwise. 8 This assumption
arises from the conflict of interest in the ratings industry. Given the non-transparent 7 New Issuer implies that it is a one shot game for the issuer and we rule out the possibility that issuers try to maximise profits over multiple periods. This assumption also ensures that issuers have the same belief as the investors about the reputation of the RAs. If we allow the same issuers to approach the rating agencies in subsequent periods, then issuers will have more information than investors.
8 This is a standard simplifying assumption in the literature. See Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) We consider a duopolistic setting of rating agencies.
10 The type of the RA is chosen ex ante by nature and is known only to the rating agency itself. The reputation of the rating agency is defined as the probability that it is honest, denoted by q i , i ∈ {1, 2}.
The reputation evolves over time depending on the ratings and outcome of the projects.
The strategy of the RA is x i , the probability the RA issues a GR to a bad project.
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The investors (and issuers) have some priors about the types of the RAs and they
Bayesian update on their beliefs. Firstly, investors and issuers take into account the rating and update the reputation of the RA, before observing the outcome of the project. Given
If not rated, q
If the project is issued a good rating by the RA, the investors update their beliefs after observing the outcome of the project.
If the project succeeds, q
If the project fails, q
We make the simplifying assumption that each issuer can only approach one RA for rating. Therefore, our model considers ratings shopping only to the extent that the issuer and the rating agency have negotiations before an official rating is issued. We do not explicitly study multiple ratings and herd behaviour of the RAs. While these are important issues that merit attention, they are not the focus of this paper. Here we look at the competition for market share among rating agencies and show that ratings inflation increases with competition.
Investors observe the rating decision and decide whether to invest. If they observe a GR from a RA with reputation q, their subjective belief that the project will succeed (using equation (1)) is given by
Given the required investment level X, investors are willing to finance the project if and only if X ≤ s(q, x)Φ, i.e. if the initial investment required for the project is no greater than its expected pay-off. Without loss of generality, assume s(q 1 , x 1 ) > s(q 2 , x 2 ). We have 3 cases:
1. If X is such that a good rating from either RA is enough, i.e X ≤ s(q, x)Φ for both q 1 and q 2 , the firm can approach either RA. 12 We assume that in this case the firm will randomly choose one of the RAs, i.e. the project goes to both RAs with equal probability.
13 2. If s(q 2 , x 2 )Φ < X < s(q 1 , x 1 )Φ , i.e. only the high reputation RA can issue ratings that can convince the investors to provide financing, hence the firm will go to RA1
and not RA2.
3. If X > s(q 1 , x 1 )Φ, the project does not get financed. 
Probability that a project comes to RA2 = 1 2
, because any project with X < λp G Φ does not need a rating to be financed, and any project with X > p G Φ is never worth financing ex-ante.
The probability that a project comes to RA1 =
The probability that a project comes to RA2 = 1 2
Reputation plays a critical role in our model. The market share of the RAs depends on s, and thus on reputation q. Since the income from giving a GR is constant (denoted by 12 We assume that the issuers are only paid when projects succeed. This implies that the issuers will be indifferent between RAs (with different reputation) given that both can guarantee financing.
13 Note that this is one of infinite many possible equilibria. Since the issuers are indifferent, we have an equilibrium for all probabilities (α ∈ (0, 1)) of approaching a specific RA . We focus on the case where α = 1 2 . Our qualitative results do not depend on the choice of α. I), the future profits of the RA will solely depend on its market share. Moreover, the RA with a higher reputation enjoys additional benefits of being the market leader, because it owns entirely the proportion of the market that cannot be rated by its competitor but can be rated by itself, whereas its competitor can only share its market with the leader.
This creates incentives for RAs to maintain or gain the market leader position and hence disciplines the RAs through competition.
We can now see that competition (modelled through market share) has two effects on lax behaviour: the market-sharing effect and the disciplining effect. The marketsharing effect refers to the fact that the RA finds lying and receiving income today more attractive as its expected future income is shared with another RA, and the disciplining effect refers to the fact that the RA finds lying less attractive in order to maintain/gain the advantages of being a market leader. We will show later that the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect and hence competition aggravates the lax behaviour of RAs in general.
4 Equilibrium Definition 1. The equilibrium in our model is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium such that, at each period t, the strategic RA always (i) Gives a good rating to a good project.
(ii) Gives a good rating to a bad project with probability x t , where 0 ≤ x t ≤ 1.
We look for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the sense that the equilibrium is "memoryless", i.e. the strategy of the strategic RA only depends on the current reputation of its opponent and itself. The equilibrium is also "symmetric", as the strategy function of both RAs (if they are both strategic) is the same. However, the RAs do not take actions simultaneously.
Let RA1 be a strategic RA and let V t (q 1 , q 2 ) denote its discounted future profits, given its reputation q 1 and its competitor's reputation q 2 , and let δ be the discount rate.
The RA's new reputation after it gives NR and the failure of a project following a GR are denoted by q 
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Figure 2: Decision-tree for Strategic RA1 its current reputation level. For notational simplicity, we suppress the time subscript of these reputation-updating functions. Figure 2 shows the decision tree of RA1. Suppose it is approached for rating. If the project is good, RA1 gives it a GR and gets income I (see Proposition 2 below). On the other hand, if the project is bad, RA1 strategically decides whether to give a GR and get fees I or refuse rating. In case of NR, RA1's reputation rises as it gets a larger market share in the future. In case of a GR, RA1's reputation falls if the project fails and remains the same if it succeeds. This in turn determines the RA1's expected future income. A similar analysis applies if RA2 is approached for rating. In this case the fees go to RA2 and RA1 is only indirectly affected through a change in RA2's reputation.
Note that since RA1 does not know the type of RA2, it has to take into account the possibility that RA2 is either honest or strategic.
The objective function of RA1 is to maximise V t (q 1 , q 2 ), the strategy being x 1 . Note that RA1's strategy is only effectual when it rates a bad project. In all other cases, RA1's strategy is inconsequential. Proposition 1. There exists a unique x 1 , where
Intuitively, it is easy to see from equation (8) that V t (q 1 , q 2 ) is linear in x 1 . This ensures that RA1's maximisation problem has a unique solution.
Proposition 2. A strategic RA does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof. See Appendix A.2 Proposition 2 implies that a strategic RA always gives GR to a good project. This is because it gets a lower pay-off if it deviates from this strategy and gives a NR to a good project. The proposition follows directly from the pay-off structure of the RAs and the beliefs.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique equilibrium as described in Definition 1.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 1 and 2. Corollary 1. Assume p G < 1. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is always positive, i.e. it inflates ratings with positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Corollary 2. Suppose the model ends in period T. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is x = 1 at t = T − 1, T .
Proof. See Appendix A.4
We now present an analytical solution in a finite period setting. We solve the model numerically in infinite horizon in Section 6.
Finite Horizon Solution
We assume the model lasts for three periods, t = 1, 2, 3, and the RAs maximise their expected total income over the three periods. We compute the equilibrium strategy of the RAs using backward induction. We already know that the strategic RA will always lie in the last two periods, as shown in Corollary 2.
We solve for the equilibrium strategy at t = 1. Again, let's look at the decision of RA1. Since RA1 will always lie at t = 2, 3, the expected pay-off of RA1 at t = 1 is
if it lies, and
if it is honest, where f (q 1 , x 1 , q 2 , x 2 ) is the probability that the project comes to RA1 next period, given its reputation q 1 , its strategy x 1 , its competitor's reputation q 2 and its competitor's strategy x 2 .
As described in Section 4, we look for an equilibrium of the game by examining the trade-off facing RA1, i.e. the difference between expressions (9) and (10). If the payoff from lying is greater then x 1 = 1 and we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 always lies; if the pay-off from not lying is greater then x 1 = 0 and we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 never lies; otherwise we have a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 is indifferent between lying and not lying, given some prior beliefs about its strategy, i.e. 0 < x 1 < 1.
To derive an analytical solution to this game, we make a simplifying assumption that p G = 1 and δ = 1. This assumption implies that the reputation of the strategic RA goes to zero if it gives a GR to a bad project since now every good project succeeds and every bad project fails. This simplifies expressions (9) and (10) and allows us to derive the equilibrium strategy of RA1. This assumption is relaxed in Section 6.
The expression of market share of RA1 depends on whether RA1 has a higher probability of success than its competitor. Given that the strategy of the strategic RA in the last two periods is to always lie, the RA with a higher reputation will have a higher market share in any single period. Hence we compute the strategy of RA1 in different ranges of the reputation of RA2.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium strategy at t = 1 assuming p G = 1 and δ = 1 is
where A is the solution to the equation
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Corollary 3. In equilibrium, x 1 is decreasing in q 1 . Moreover, x 1 is increasing in q 2 using first order Taylor approximation.
Proposition 4 implies that the strategy of RA1 depends on its own and its competitor's reputation. When A is large, RA1 always gives a GR to a bad project. Conversely, when
A is small RA1 behaves honestly and gives NR to bad projects. In the intermediate range, RA1 has a mixed strategy, with 0 < x 1 < 1. Note that the lower threshold for A is increasing with RA1's reputation.
The results imply that RA1 tends to lie less as its reputation increases (Corollary 3). The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Since we assumed p G = 1, the reputation of RA1 goes to zero immediately after a project fails. This means that the cost of lying increases with RA1's reputation while the benefit of lying stays constant.
Hence it is not surprising that RA1 prefers to lie less as its reputation increases.
14 Moreover, according to Corollary 3, RA1's strategy tends to increase with RA2's reputation. As explained before, competition has two opposite effects on the behaviour of RA1: the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. When the reputation of its opponent increases, RA1 will find it less attractive to increase its own reputation given a smaller expected future market share, and hence will behave more laxly. On the other hand, RA1 may have incentives to behave honestly when RA2's reputation increases in order to maintain its market leader position. Our analysis shows that the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect, using first order Taylor approximation.
One potential explanation could be that, in our model, the market share of a rating agency is determined not only by its reputation relative to that of its competitor, but also by the absolute level of its reputation. That is, even a monopolistic RA cannot behave totally laxly, because otherwise its reputation would become too low to credibly 14 Our results in section 6 show that this is no longer true if p G < 1. The penalty on reputation will be smaller as the reputation of RA increases, i.e. the cost of ratings inflation can decrease with reputation, resulting in a 'u-shaped' relationship between strategy and reputation. rate most projects. Therefore, the incentives of a RA to maintain good reputation, even in absence of competition, render the disciplining effect of competition weaker. We believe this is reasonable because in reality, given rational investors, a monopolistic RA would not have unbounded market powers.
However, the results above are based on a three-period model with the assumption that p G = 1, i.e. the strategic RA is caught immediately after the project fails. The results may be driven by the fact that the RAs only live for three periods and hence have limited potential gains associated with higher reputation. In order to capture the long-term benefits of reputation under a more general setting, we move on to the next section, where we relax parameter assumptions and compute numerical solutions in an infinite-horizon case.
Infinite Horizon Solution
We now present the numerical solution of the model in infinite horizon. The numerical solution is once again computed using backward induction, i.e. we first solve the model in the finite period case, and then increase the number of periods so that the equilibrium strategy converges to the infinite horizon solution.
In an infinite period setting, V t by itself is independent of t. Hence we suppress the time subscript for notational simplicity. However, the reputations evolve over time as investors (and issuers) update their beliefs. Let RA1 be the rating agency that behaves strategically. Then, RA1's value function takes the following form:
is the probability that the issuer approaches RA1 for rating,
is the probability that the issuer approaches RA2 and
is the probability that the project is not rated by either RA.
We assume that the model ends at period T and solve the model backwards. We know that the strategic RA will always lie at period T and T − 1 according to Corollary 2. For all t < T − 1, the strategy of the RA depends on its own and its competitors' reputation. We solve for the equilibrium strategy of the RA described in Section 4. We look at the pay-offs from lying and being honest and determine the strategy. As long
, q 2 ) for x t = 1, RA1 will always choose to lie. Conversely,
, q 2 ) for x t = 0, RA1 will always tell the truth. In all other intermediate cases, there exists a unique x t s.t. I + V t (q F 1 , q 2 ) = V t (q N 1 , q 2 ) at which RA1 is indifferent between lying or not. Hence we deduce inductively the equilibrium strategies of RA1. As T goes to infinity, we approach the infinite horizon solution. Since δ < 1, the Blackwell conditions are satisfied.
Using this procedure, we solve the model for various parameter values. At the first instance, we solve the model for a monopolistic RA. Next, we introduce competition in the form of RA2 and show that the additional competitive element is not sufficient to discipline the RAs. Furthermore, our results show that competition will in fact increase ratings inflation.
Monopolistic RA
First we consider the case where there is only one RA in the market. In order to make RA1 a monopolist, we set the reputation of RA2 to 0. 15 We can clearly see the strategy of RA1 is 'u-shaped' in its reputation.
Intuitively, the RA's strategy is determined by the trade-off between current fees and expected future income. When its reputation is very low, the RA's expected future 15 Note that we have chosen this set of parameters (λ, p G , δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9) for the purpose of illustration only, and verified that our results are robust to other parameter specifications, the plot of which are available upon request. In particular, robustness checks of the main results (Section 6.3) are presented in Appendix B. income is very small compared to current fees, hence it has little incentive to behave honestly. When its reputation increases, the RA's future income becomes larger while current fees stay the same, the RA tends to lie less. However, when the RA's reputation is very high, the penalty for lying decreases, and the RA starts to lie more. The reason that the penalty for lying decreases with reputation is that investors attribute project failures to bad luck rather than lax behaviour when they believe that the RA is very likely to be of the honest type. decreasing in p G . 16 The intuition is that, the reputational penalty of lying depends on how the investors update their beliefs. If projects are more likely to be good (higher λ) or if good projects are more likely to fail (lower p G ), then a failure is more likely to be attributed to bad luck rather than lying. Anticipating this smaller cost of lying on reputation, the RA would choose to lie more when λ increases or p G decreases.
Competitive RA
We now look at the impact of competition on the behaviour of rating agencies by introducing a second RA (RA2). Figure 6 shows the relationship between the reputation and strategy of RA1 for different values of the competing RA2's reputation. As we can see, the relationship between the reputation and strategy of RA1 remains 'u-shaped' as in the monopolistic case. Moreover, as the reputation of RA2 increases, the reputation at which RA1 has minimum x 1 , i.e. is least likely to lie, also increases. This is not surprising as the disciplining effect is greatest when the reputation of the competing RA (RA2) is close to the reputation of RA1. This is because when the RAs' reputations are close, it is more likely that the market leadership will change, resulting in more disciplined behaviour. Conversely, if the two RAs have very different reputations, the disciplining effect is relatively weaker. far apart, which implies that the probability of a change of market leader is very small.
On the other hand, the market-sharing effect is always increasing in the competing RA's reputation. When the reputation of RA2 is low, the market-sharing effect is very small as RA2 can only take away a tiny fraction of market share. As RA2's reputation starts to increase, RA1 tends to lie less as the disciplining effect dominates the market-sharing effect. However, when RA2's reputation goes beyond a certain level, the market-sharing effect dominates as RA2's reputation becomes much higher than RA1's. Hence RA1 will lie more for high values of RA2's reputation, due to the dominance of the market-sharing effect. Figures 8 and 9 show the expected profits of RA1 as a function of RA1 and RA2's reputation. We can clearly see that the expected profits of RA1 are increasing in its own reputation, and decreasing in its competitor's reputation, illustrating the market-sharing effect. Finally, Figure 10 shows the convergence dynamics. It plots the change in RA1's strategy as the number of periods remaining increases. Reputation becomes less and less important as the number of periods remaining declines since there are fewer periods to reap the benefits of higher reputation. Thus ratings inflation increases. Note that as the number of periods remaining increases, the strategy converges, implying that we approach a long (infinite) horizon equilibrium.
In summary, our results show that introducing competition in the form of a second RA is not sufficient to discipline the RAs which always lie with positive probability in equilibrium. We now show that competition will actually increase the lax behaviour of RAs and reduce expected welfare.
Comparing Monopolistic and Competitive RA
It is often suggested that introducing more competition in the ratings industry can alleviate the problem of improper incentives and ratings inflation. However, our results show that competition is likely to worsen this situation and lead to more ratings inflation. We observe that in most cases, RA1 is prone to greater ratings inflation relative to the monopolistic RA.
As described before, the implication of competition can be divided into the marketsharing effect and the disciplining effect. We can see that the market-sharing effect dominates the disciplining effect (i.e. competition aggravates lax behaviour) in most cases. The only case where competition may actually alleviate the lax behaviour of RA1 is when q 2 is very low (as shown in Figure 11(a) ). This is because the market-sharing effect is weakest relative to the disciplining effect for low values of q 2 . Intuitively, the disciplining effect only depends on the difference between q 1 and q 2 , whereas the marketsharing effect increases with the absolute level of q 2 . Hence the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect except for low values of q 2 . In order to assess the overall impact of competition, we compute the expected increase in lax behaviour of RA1 given its own reputation, assuming that the reputation of RA2 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. A positive value of this measure means the overall effect of enhanced competition on RA1 is to lie more (i.e inflate ratings more).
As shown in Figure 12 , the expected increase in lax behaviour of RA1 is always positive, indicating that competition will, in general, aggravate ratings inflation. This is because a smaller market share will tend to reduce the reputational concerns of the RAs, and this market-sharing effect outweighs the disciplining effect brought by competition.
Moreover, we can see that the expected increase in lax behaviour is increasing for low values of RA1's own reputation and decreasing for high values of RA1's reputation. The intuition is that, when the reputation of RA1 is low, the market share of RA1 is going to shrink significantly after introducing RA2 and the market-sharing effect of competition is strongest. However, when the reputation of RA1 is high, the impact of introducing RA2 on RA1's market share is small, hence the market-sharing effect becomes weaker and RA1 will lie relatively less. We verify that the excess lax behaviour, as defined above, is always positive for other values of λ and p G in Appendix B.1. In addition, we measure the expected total welfare in both monopolistic and duopolistic settings as defined below. Figure 13 compares the total welfare 17 between the monopolistic case and the duopolistic case where both RAs have the same reputation. We can see that if a new RA is 17 We are computing the welfare in one period only because it does not depend on time. introduced with the same reputation as the incumbent RA, then the total welfare will always decrease, due to the fact that both RAs are more likely to inflate ratings.
Moreover, when we compare in Figure 14 , the expected total welfare between the monopolistic case and the duopolistic case with fixed values of reputations of RA2, we can see that introducing competition will always lead to lower total welfare as long as the reputation of RA2 is lower than the reputation of RA1. However, total welfare may increase if the entrant RA has a higher reputation than the incumbent. Overall, this implies that competition is likely to adversely impact total welfare, unless we can introduce a new RA with much higher reputation than the incumbent. We check the robustness of this result for different values of λ and p G in Appendix B.2. 
Conclusion
In this paper we show that competition can amplify ratings inflation and the lax behaviour of rating agencies, reducing total welfare. This result has important policy implications since it suggests that the most often cited solution to ratings inflation -enhanced competition in the ratings industry -is likely to render the situation worse. While we acknowledge that in order to focus on the implications of competition in the credit ratings industry, we have abstracted from other important issues such as herd behaviour, multiple ratings, and the quality of the models used by rating agencies, we believe that our results can serve as a baseline for evaluating the reform proposals currently being discussed.
One of the key thrusts of recent regulatory action in the credit ratings space has been to relax barriers to entry and enhance competition. In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission has relaxed some barriers to entry and allowed several new CRAs in the US to obtain the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) status. The European Union (EU) has gone further and has introduced new requirements as part of the proposed amendments to the EU Regulation on credit rating agencies, the so called 'CRA-III'. The new legislation seeks to place a cap on the market share of each ratings agency and requires issuers to rotate credit rating agencies periodically (see European Commission (2011) for details).
In the context of our model, the cap on the market share of rating agencies is likely to incentivise RAs to inflate ratings when their market share is close to the cap since they would no longer benefit from higher reputation. Furthermore, proposals to rotate RAs would mean that RAs would be assured of a market share, irrespective of their reputation.
This would break the link between reputation and future income, thereby increasing ratings inflation. More broadly, proposals aimed at artificially enhancing competition are likely to exacerbate the market sharing effect, while doing little to increase the discipling effect.
One of the key findings in our model is that unless the new entrant RA has a higher reputation than the incumbent, increased competition is likely to adversely impact total welfare. However, it is unlikely that a new entrant would have sufficiently high reputation (and hence market share) to challenge the incumbents. It is more plausible to believe that the new entrants would start off as marginal players. Moreover, it is likely that under the current issuer pay model, they will continue to remain marginal players as their low reputation (and associated market share) would incentivise them to inflate ratings more than the established RAs. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence suggests that ratings issued by Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), a relatively new player in the European market, are significantly more lenient than those issued by the more established players.
In conjunction with related work on multiple ratings and herd behaviour in the credit ratings industry, our results suggest that a fundamental reorganisation of the industry may be required to align the incentives. The conflict of interest highlighted in our paper is fundamental to the issuer-pay model and any meaningful attempt to resolve the conflict would require a fundamental shift in the way rating agencies are compensated. Empirical work by Xia and Strobl (2012) suggests that investor paid RAs can be a solution as they are unlikely to be affected by the conflict of interest highlighted in this paper and can have a discipling effect on the incumbent RAs. However, while an investor pay RAs can be a solution, free riding on the part of investors could result in insufficient revenues for such RAs, making it difficult for them to compete with the incumbents. Deb and Murphy (2009) argue that although free riding is a problem, the increasing use of ratings by institutions, coupled with the rise in the speed of information diffusion in the markets over the last few decades could, with proper regulatory encouragement, ensure that there are investors willing to subscribe to ratings issued by investor pay RAs.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
There exists a unique x 1 , where 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ 1, given that V t (q 1 , q 2 ) is an increasing function in q 1 .
Proof. When the strategic RA (RA1) gets a bad project, it will get pay-off Ψ(lie) = I + δV t (q 
, i.e. q F 1 is decreasing in x 1 and q N 1 is increasing in x 1 . Given that V t (q 1 , q 2 ) is increasing in q 1 , it is easy to see that Ψ(lie) is decreasing in x 1 and that Ψ(honest) is increasing in x 1 . Thus if we define
it follows that x 1 is well-defined and unique.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The strategic RA does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof. Suppose that the strategic RA (RA1) gets a good project and that its strategy is x 1 . Let's examine whether RA1 wants to deviate:
. If the RA1 gives NR to the good project, it will get δV t (q N 1 , q 2 ), and
does not want to deviate.
• if x 1 = 0, q N 1 = q F 1 = q 1 , hence reputation becomes irrelevant and the RA does not have an incentive to give NR to the good project.
, and hence RA1 does not want to deviate. Therefore RA1 does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Assume p G < 1. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is always positive.
Proof. Suppose that the equilibrium strategy is x 1 = 0. Then q N 1 = q F 1 = q 1 and we must have I + δV t (q 1 , q 2 ) ≤ δV t (q 1 , q 2 ). This is impossible as long as I > 0. Hence x 1 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose the model ends in period T. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is x t = 1 at t = T − 1, T .
Proof. At t = T , the strategic RA does not have any reputational concerns. This implies that the strategy of strategic RA will be to always give GR if the project is bad, i.e.
Similarly, at t = T − 1 the strategic RA will always lie. Suppose that a bad project comes to strategic RA, say RA1. The expected pay-off of RA1 is
if it lies, i.e. gives a good rating, and
if it does not lie, i.e. gives no rating, where f (q 1 , x 1 , q 2 , x 2 ) is the probability that the project comes to RA1 in the next period. Using equations (5), (6) and (7) we have
Although in this case RA1 does have reputational concerns, these are not sufficient to prevent RA1 from being lax and not giving GR to bad projects. Since by being honest RA1 is giving up I today, in exchange for having a higher chance of getting I in the next period, it is not optimal for RA1 to be honest, given that RA1 is impatient (i.e. δ < 1).
Hence the optimal strategy of RA1 is to always lie, i.e. x T −1 = 1.
The equilibrium strategy at t = 1 assuming p G = 1 and δ = 1 is
.
In addition, x 1 is decreasing in q 1 . Moreover, x 1 is increasing in q 2 using first order Taylor approximation.
Proof. Since p G = 1, the reputation of RA1 (i.e. the strategic RA) will go to zero if it gives a GR to a bad project since now every good project succeeds and every bad project fails. So the expected pay-off from giving a GR to a bad project is I. This simplifies expressions (9) and (10) and allows us to derive RA1's equilibrium strategy.
The expected pay-off from being honest is
can be rewritten as
The expected pay-off from lying is I, since the RA's reputation goes to zero Ψ(lie) = I
We look for a equilibrium of the game by examining RA1's trade-off between lying and not lying. If the pay-off from lying is greater when x 1 = 1, we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 always lies; if the pay-off from not lying is greater when x 1 = 0, we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 never lies; otherwise we have a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 is indifferent between lying or not given some prior beliefs about its strategy, i.e. 0 < x 1 < 1.
We now solve the equation Ψ(lie) − Ψ(honest) = 0. We do this in 2 stages. In the first stage, we solve the equation in terms of A and then using the expression for A, we solve for the equilibrium value of x 1 .
For A < B we have Ψ(lie) − Ψ(honest) = δ 2 (1 − λ)(2 − q 2 )A 2 − δ + 2Bδ 2 λ + 2Bδ 2 (1 − λ)(2 − q 2 ) A + 1 Assuming δ = 1, the solution is A = B + 1 + 2Bλ − (1 + 2Bλ) 2 + (1 − λ)(2 − q 2 ) 2(1 − λ)(2 − q 2 ) which is valid 18 as long as = B 2 2 − (1 − λ)q 2 + B − 1 > 0.
Note that B can be simplified to B = λq 2 2 1 − q 2 (1 − λ)
We can see that B is bounded above by , which is negative. Hence the minimum is positive for q 2 > 0. Therefore A is always increasing in q 2 .
Now we have shown that there always exists a solution which depends on the parameter . Since A always has a solution, we can use it to find the equilibrium strategy x 1 in terms of A, i.e. we will look for the value of x 1 such that
Note that assuming p G = 1 implies λp G = λ. Using this and equation (5) 
